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Abstract Building on the author’s recent survey of Western knowledge institutions since
antiquity, this article assesses the impact of current trends in information technology, higher
education, science, and the environment on knowledge production. Its focus on institutions
diverges from conventional histories of ideas, media, and technologies but also from the under-
standings of knowledge and information prevalent among economists. It instead identifies
patterns by which entirely new institutions of knowledge supersede their predecessors, reconcep-
tualizing today’s changes around the fitful process by which the laboratory, broadly understood,
outgrows the tutelage of the academic disciplines.
Keywords: knowledge institutions; information technology; higher education;
laboratory science; social science; academic disciplines
Introduction
The advent of the Internet has given rise to a widespread belief that the very defini-
tion of knowledge is about to change. We once viewed knowledge as a body of
learning lodged in books and journals and governed by groups of credentialed
specialists. Now, computer networks make a vast panoply of digitized information
instantaneously accessible to anyone and everyone. To some observers, user partici-
pation, mass collaboration, and reliance on the ‘wisdom of crowds’ suggest that
virtual communities will challenge experts for the power to create and define
knowledge.2 This democratization of information promises to fulfill longstanding
prophecies of a ‘knowledge society’ in which knowledge-producing capacities are
far more widely distributed among organizations and individuals than in the past.
Such changes have coincided with a broader set of societal trends. Talk of ‘knowl-
edge work’, ‘cities of knowledge’, and the ‘knowledge economy’ reflects
the relocation of many knowledge-producing capacities outside of universities and
into zones of private enterprise. Economists now track the movement of
knowledge through and among corporations and measure its impact on economic
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productivity with increasing precision.3 Management experts seek to harness the
talents of knowledge workers roaming among firms in search of lucrative and
personally fulfilling employment.4 Sociologists document the informal networks of
skill and expertise that these workers spontaneously create.5
Meanwhile, universities, the traditional bastions of knowledge production, feel
pulled in two directions. As research-driven anchors of the knowledge economy,
they enjoy commanding influence in channeling new inventions, new workers, and
new skills into the private sector, particularly in science and technology fields. But
at the same time they suffer from increasing incoherence in their mission as provid-
ers of higher education. In the United States, the canon wars and battles over polit-
ical correctness that shook liberal-arts curricula in the 1990s may have largely
subsided, but calls to make liberal education more practical and more marketable
have only increased in intensity. Both Anglophone and continental European
universities are under mounting pressure to standardize the meaning of their
degrees and, by extension, streamline the market in these educational credentials.
All this has occurred as new digital media erode inherited forms of textual literacy,
critical thinking, and other staples of classical liberal learning. Universities today
both benefit from and are threatened by the unmooring of knowledge from its
historic institutional monopolies.
Looming over these developments, centered mainly on the West, are others
affecting the pursuit of knowledge worldwide. Economic and cultural globalization
and the challenges of environmental degradation and resource depletion have now
clearly established themselves as dominant trends of the twenty-first century. The
formidable ecological barriers to sustainable economic growth and social develop-
ment will create staggering new demands for knowledge-based solutions and at the
same time reshape the institutions that produce these solutions. But it is by no
means guaranteed that they will be able to respond with sufficient creativity and
vigor. On issues ranging from global warming to the exhaustion of fossil fuels to
the lack of clean water, ‘science’, ‘technology’, ‘research’, and ‘innovation’ may
ultimately be insufficient to stave off a profound disruption of lifestyles and a
decline in living standards even in the most prosperous parts of the world. And
despite the worldwide ascendancy of Western science and universities—a global
monoculture in knowledge—the intense cultural frictions that a shared knowledge
system might be expected to ameliorate show no sign of dissipating. There is as
much reason for concern as there is for optimism as we contemplate the trajecto-
ries of knowledge in the future.
The scope, scale, and convergence of these trends invite comparison with past
upheavals in the organization of knowledge, reaching in the Western tradition
all the way back to the library at Alexandria. In this article I adopt just such a
perspective to put today’s rapidly globalizing knowledge society in historical
context. Drawing extensively on my recently published book, Reinventing Knowledge:
From Alexandria to the Internet,6 I will first propose a model for understanding
upheavals in knowledge. My focus on institutions departs not only from conven-
tional histories of ideas, technologies, and media but also from the understandings
of knowledge and information prevalent among economists and economic
theorists. I will next apply this institutional model to a series of current trends in
information technology, higher education, science, and the environment. This
analysis reveals that for all the undeniable drama and uncertainty surrounding the
fate of the ‘knowledge society’, reassuring signs abound of a recurrence of familiar
patterns of institutional change. The regularity of these patterns throughout
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history in fact offers a powerful means of predicting future developments. Among
other things, this suggests that if an entirely new institution of knowledge is to
emerge, it is likely to form more in response to the threats of environmental
degradation than to the opportunities of globalized consumerism.
Institutions of Knowledge in Historical Perspective
Reinventing Knowledge traces the six institutions that have produced, reproduced,
and redefined knowledge over the past 2,300 years in the West.7 These institutions
are, in chronological sequence, the library, the monastery, the university, the repub-
lic of letters, the disciplines, and the laboratory. (The republic of letters encom-
passed early modern correspondence networks, books and journals, museums, and
learned academies.) Each institution coalesced in an epoch of profound upheaval,
responding to sweeping political, economic, or religious changes that destabilized
its predecessor. Each such upheaval gave small but pivotally situated groups of intel-
lectuals a remarkable creative mandate to redefine what knowledge means, how we
should pursue it, and how we judge ourselves to have attained it. Such ‘reinventions’
of knowledge established durable, clonable institutional templates that preserved
the same basic features even when they later underwent mid-level modifications like
curricular reforms, adaptations to cultures and languages, and even major doctrinal
and paradigm shifts.
New institutions also cause their predecessors to be revamped and reformed in
their wake. Older institutions are repeatedly recycled and refurbished as, for exam-
ple, the medieval monastery absorbed the libraries of ancient Rome, remaking the
study of classic books around Christianity’s new ascetic and devotional practices. So
too, what seems today’s dominant knowledge institution—the university—has for
some five centuries acted as a repurposable shell subservient to its successors, most
notably the academic disciplines. What we may now be witnessing is a protracted,
ongoing process whereby the disciplines cede hegemony to the last institution in
the sequence: the laboratory.
Patterns of Institutional Change
Because the argument of Reinventing Knowledge diverges significantly from conven-
tional accounts of intellectual change, it is critical to understand what reinventions
of knowledge entail before tracking the story of institutional succession into our
own times. Table 1 depicts the development of knowledge institutions since antiq-
uity, matching each one to its epoch of inception, to its original template or proto-
type, and to the new definition of knowledge it established for later generations.
Table 1. Knowledge institutions since antiquity
Institution Epoch Template/prototype Knowledge is that which can be …
The library 300 BCE–500 CE Alexandria reasoned from texts
The monastery 500–1100 Benedictines enacted as devotional ritual
The university 1100–1500 Paris and Bologna structured as disputation
The republic of letters 1500–1750 Copernicanism legitimated by humanist rhetoric
The disciplines 1750–1900 Classical philology sanctioned by specialist 
communities
The laboratory 1900–present Pasteur’s replicated through experiment
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Thus the Library at Alexandria, Egypt, founded ca. 300 BCE by the successors of
Alexander the Great, aimed not simply to collect all the known world’s books but
also to redefine knowledge around written scholarship instead of oral debate. Its
resident scholars pioneered modes of textual scholarship founded on critical read-
ing, editing and translation, and synthesis of written materials. Their often pedan-
tic research practices contrasted markedly with the verbal, extemporaneous,
primarily non-written philosophizing of Socrates and Plato. But this shift neatly
reflected new empire-builders’ aims to render Greek culture as portable as books
themselves and thereby assert Greek hegemony across the Mediterranean world.
Libraries in later empires followed Alexandria’s example until—in the fifth-century
West, at least—the Roman Empire collapsed and cities declined, leaving Christian
monasteries to assume the libraries’ function of conserving manuscripts. Early
monks, however, starting with the Benedictines, adopted a fundamentally different
rationale for keeping and studying texts: reading them for spiritual enlightenment
and composing new ones to regulate their lives in devotional community, once
literally rubbing out a work by Cicero to recycle parchment for one by St. August-
ine. Silent monastic reading dominated the life of learning until Europe’s twelfth-
century demographic, economic, and urban recovery sparked the formation of
new scholarly guilds called universities, first at Paris and Bologna, and eventually
throughout Latin Christendom. Abandoning monastic silence, universities revived
oral argument through vocal ‘disputations’, in essence knights’ tournaments for
scholars. Such rituals cemented fraternity among masters and students working
through scholastic conundrums in theology, law, and medicine. Verbal sparring
also prepared medieval university students to enter real-world occupations in these
fields and join Europe’s first knowledge economy.
The West’s first three knowledge institutions illustrate how reconfigurations in
the practices and rationales for pursuing knowledge invariably conformed to
familiar civilizational transformations. In each instance, broad historical changes
underwrote a new social contract between scholarly communities and the world
beyond which in turn redefined knowledge itself. In contrast to these ‘bricks and
mortar’ institutions, the next two seem more ephemeral, having grown amidst the
university-based knowledge system we have inherited from the Middle Ages. But
their reinventions of knowledge have been no less profound on that account.
Indeed, while external social forces have continued to drive the evolution of knowl-
edge institutions, intellectuals in the last five centuries have become even more
successful in establishing autonomous standards of scholarship.
The republic of letters arose during the European wars of religion as an
international correspondence network keeping scholars in contact as the medieval
universities devolved into ideological bootcamps for one or another rival confes-
sion, Protestant or Catholic, often under the political pressure of their ruler-
patrons. Besides the handwritten letters of figures like Erasmus and Descartes, the
republic also encompassed learned academies, museums, and—above all—printed
books and journals. In all of these venues, scholars revived models of humanist
rhetoric from the ancient Romans (Cicero, preeminently) to institute greater civil-
ity and politeness in their exchanges with colleagues. This enabled them to cope
with the many other intellectual challenges and disruptions of the time, such as the
discovery of the New World and the Copernican Revolution. Copernicanism in
particular showed how new knowledge not sanctioned by ancient texts could be
legitimated through recourse to well-crafted humanist rhetoric. Whether in
Copernicus’ shrewdly deferential De Revolutionibus or Galileo’s exquisitely polite
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epistolary appeals to patrons and colleagues, the republic exhibited a remarkable
resiliency in the face of massive ideological opposition and formidable physical
barriers to international communication.
By the late 1700s, books, journals, academies, and museums had begun to
eclipse universities, many of them by then backwaters of mediocrity, pedantry, and
alcoholism. Historians of the Enlightenment often speak of a media revolution,
seeing in commercial publishing ventures like the multivolume French Encyclopédie
a parallel to the massive growth of today’s information-rich society.8 But in a
dramatic reversal, seekers of knowledge, instead of procuring a set of quality ency-
clopedias and setting forth into the world, streamed back into the universities. This
seed of reinvention was sown not in ultramodern France but in backward Germany,
among evangelical Protestants who bucked the Enlightenment trend toward ‘exten-
sive’, promiscuous consumption of print to make Bible study groups the center-
piece of an ever more intensive practice of reading and scholarship. A string of
largely unsung reformers like J. D. Michaelis and F. A. Wolf made seminaries—later
called seminars—the seedbeds of disciplined research and disciplinary specializa-
tion, first in Biblical and then in classical philology. Redeeming orality once more,
they refurbished the university as a site of face-to-face study one could not find in
disembodied print media. After Wolf’s disciple Wilhelm von Humboldt founded
the world’s first research university in Berlin, seminars soon sprang up in a range of
fields from philology and history to chemistry and psychology. From these humble
beginnings developed the panoply of disciplines we still recognize today. The
inception of the disciplines thus offers another surprising instance of a small cluster
of intellectuals who reinvented knowledge, fusing disparate cultural resources in
unprecedented recombinations as the raw materials of a new institution.
The Disciplines
For all of its hallowed Gothic traditions, the research university was a fundamen-
tally novel institution in being dominated by specialized disciplines. Sociologically,
the disciplinary university reflected the emergence of the modern nation-state, the
first to insist that culture be made the patrimony of all of its citizens and to create
markets in education to produce broad-minded citizens. Disciplines emerged in
earnest as nineteenth-century German states constructed systems of public educa-
tion beginning with compulsory primary schooling and crowned by reformed
universities. Competition induced the states of this still-disunited nation to poach
professors who freely roamed within the boundaries of the German culture region.
Founding their own specialized seminars to train acolytes in new fields and propa-
gate new methodologies, scholars in the disciplines carved out niches at will, from
pure curiosity, within a publicly subsidized marketplace of ideas. In classic Smithian
fashion, the growing national market in tertiary education drove the division of
academic labor, producing far-flung communities of specialists whose individual
members inhabited particular universities as part of a larger career trajectory.
These disciplinary networks in turn retooled the print media of the republic of
letters to make scholarly books and journals into what can still be regarded as an
elaborate system of professional calling-card distribution.
Disciplinary communities soon came to govern the career expectations, intellec-
tual horizons, and identities of practicing scholars elsewhere as well. Many US
universities, beginning with Johns Hopkins, adopted the German system wholesale,
embedding disciplines in formal administrative departments and linking them to
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undergraduate majors in ways that further solidified their almost impregnable role
in higher education.9 Western European nations (and their overseas colonies)
followed a more circuitous route10 but likewise ended up with a common package
of disciplinary practices and sub-institutions, including the PhD, specialized
academic job markets, extensive peer review, professional conferences and jour-
nals, and other all-too-familiar components of modern academic life. Japan and
China, too, had by the turn of the twentieth century embarked upon similar
courses in an explicit attempt to develop themselves as nation-states.11 China
famously abolished its millennium-old Confucian examination system in 1905 and
later instituted research-oriented disciplines at Beijing University under the chan-
cellorship of the German-trained Cai Yuanpei.12
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the only traditional institutional rival to
the research university worldwide remains the Islamic madrasa, which continues
to thrive not only in its now-notorious capacity as a training center for Muslim
fundamentalists, but in a host of other incarnations, many of them surprisingly
modern and progressive.13 Still, research universities and their associated disci-
plines are unlikely to be supplanted by an alternative, non-Western institution
either in the Muslim world or anywhere else. Academic disciplines, housed in the
universities they long ago colonized and refurbished, remain in many respects
the dominant institution of knowledge in both the Western and non-Western
worlds.
The Laboratory
The laboratory emerged from within the disciplines to become what is now argu-
ably a separate institution. Despite its initial containment within the research
university, it has long demonstrated an amphibious capability to thrive in non-
academic settings as well. In our own times, it has continued to evolve institution-
ally by generating new knowledge through methods of skilled experimentation.
The treatment of the laboratory in Reinventing Knowledge begins with the migra-
tion of the scientific demonstrations and experiments of the high republic of
letters into the disciplinary seminars of the nineteenth-century university. First in
chemistry and later in other fields, the laboratory acted as a conduit for craft skills,
hands-on knowledge gained through trial and experiment, which superseded the
literary skills even Galileo and Copernicus had to master to persuade fellow schol-
ars of their discoveries. The new seminar pedagogy proved ideal for imparting this
tacit or craft knowledge. By no means an uncontested development, the incorpora-
tion of natural-science disciplines into the research university was at first resisted by
philologically-minded humanists who likened hands-on laboratory practices to
artisanal work. But by Pasteur’s time, the laboratory had not only secured an undis-
puted place among the disciplines but also begun to demonstrate an ability to serve
other social needs besides those of the higher education system. Improving human
welfare by manipulating contained spaces—from anthrax-ridden cattle farms to
modern refrigerators containing pasteurized milk—laboratory scientists redefined
knowledge around controlled experiments that could be reliably replicated and
held out as objective truth by scientific experts. Their achievements also enabled
the laboratory to expand its claims in two crucial ways that expand our traditional
view of the institution.
First, the laboratory encompasses not just the natural but also the social
sciences. Industrialization and urbanization, particularly in the United States,
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created entirely novel social spaces whose social scripts and rules of interaction
were subjected to study and experimental manipulation by self-styled experts.
These spaces included the public school, a site where university psychologists devel-
oped mass intelligence testing as a means to track both over- and underachievers;
the factory floor, where time-and-motion specialists and other species of manage-
ment consultants conducted experiments to increase worker productivity; and
immigrant slums, where large-scale foundations endowed by robber barons
dispensed ‘scientific philanthropy’ based on social research findings generated by
academics sent to do fieldwork among the impoverished. In these and other cases,
social scientists aspired to the rigorous protocols of objectivity established by their
colleagues in the natural sciences even if they clearly did not meet them in every
case. Such technocratic ‘scientism’ reached its apogee in the urban redevelopment
and Third World modernization schemes of the 1950s and 1960s, which made
whole cities and countries into spaces for social-scientific experimentation and
manipulation, from the planned city of Brasilia to the Strategic Hamlet Program in
Vietnam.14 The subsequent discrediting of large-scale social engineering, while
engendering greater humility among social scientists and greater vigilance among
their patrons, has by no means led to the abandonment of rigorous experimental
attempts to assess and solve social problems, however. Social-scientific methods still
assume commanding influence in contemporary schools, hospitals, workplaces,
cities, and government policymaking forums of all sorts.
As a second characteristic, already implicit in the examples above, the labora-
tory bestrides the university and non-university worlds, colonizing the state and in
particular the corporation. In our own times, the spectacular successes of entrepre-
neurial startups in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, computing, and materials
science, often founded in the shadow of nearby universities, provide ready
instances of this amphibious capability in the natural sciences. But so too, the social
sciences find lucrative market niches and broad societal impact in practices from
management consulting to advertising research, instructional curriculum design to
health care policy reform, and the activities of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and development agencies of all stripes. While typically importing
disciplinary methods and techniques from academia, laboratory practitioners in
these extra-academic settings are not in all instances confined by them. Instead
they subject their experiments to the alternative disciplines of the market and the
political process.
As a secular trend, corporations have since the 1970s displaced the state as
favored spaces for the expansion of laboratory practices and ideologies. Thatcher-
ism and Reaganism in the West weakened governments as sponsors of technocratic
social development schemes, while the fall of the Soviet Union revealed history’s
largest scientistic social experiment as an abject failure. Since the 1990s, the exper-
imentalism of the laboratory has comported more readily with the entrepreneur-
ship of the corporation, and is especially congenial to modern liberal-democratic,
capitalist-consumerist, technologically-oriented societies. Market economies,
whether formally democratic or not, ease the consensual adoption of new products
and practices emanating from the laboratory in ways that the technocratic state
historically could not. And yet, the colossal financial-market meltdown of 2008
proved that social-scientific engineering is by no means a relic of the past. Fueled in
large measure by highly sophisticated risk modeling techniques, some developed
by ‘quants’ who emigrated from academia, the financial crisis demonstrated how
an academic disciplinary theory (the efficient markets hypothesis) legitimized the
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creation of experimental new practices (like credit-default swaps) whose failure
caused tangible dislocation in the economy and in society—ironically enough in a
climate of deliberate state deregulation.
For good or ill, the laboratory seems poised to outgrow the tutelage of the disci-
plines and emerge as today’s dominant knowledge institution, both inside and
outside the university. As an amphibious institution, the laboratory enjoys a poten-
tial for expansion not limited by the markets for higher education that sustain but
also constrain the growth of disciplines. And yet disciplines and universities show
no signs of ceding their central role in the production of knowledge. Here it is
important to recall that reinventions of knowledge invariably repurpose older insti-
tutions. Throughout history, the same texts, ideas, scholarly practices, buildings,
and symbols of continuity and tradition have been so often reused and recycled
that it is easy to miss the profound disruptures and discontinuities marking the
succession of one institution to another. Signs of the laboratory’s hegemony are
therefore ambiguous and difficult to interpret but nonetheless dramatic and
pervasive. The question confronting us now is how to apply the patterns of past
reinventions to an understanding of the present.
Current Trends and Institutional Trajectories
Extrapolating into the future, several scenarios are possible as institutions of
knowledge develop further: the cohabitation and partial overlap of the disciplines
and the laboratory may continue, the laboratory may reinvent and repurpose the
disciplines, or an entirely new institution of knowledge may supersede them both.
In this section, I canvass several current trends to determine which of these is most
likely.
Information Technology
By the early 2000s, the explosive development of computer networks and new
information media suggested to some that physical books and journals are
destined to be replaced by the virtual, digital provision of knowledge. The boldest
enthusiasts of distance learning hold out the same prospect for university
campuses themselves.15 Ambitious schemes to digitize everything knowable,
render it machine-searchable, and disseminate it over networks were already a
staple of serious speculation among Cold War engineers and academics, but only
the more recent development of services like Google, Wikipedia, and a host of
social networking sites has brought their visions to life. Collectively dubbed Web
2.0, these sites rely on continuous user feedback and participation in ways unan-
ticipated by the original architects of the information superhighway. Cyberspace
verily teems with social experiments like this, conducted by software engineers
and subject to massive continuous referendum by an innumerable body of wired
lay contributors. Colossal, consensual, and virtual, cyberspace is the latest of the
spaces colonized by the laboratory, and, as a disembodied creation of technology,
the one most immune to the deleterious ethical and environmental conse-
quences that previous manipulations of actual physical and social spaces have
often entailed.16 The Internet was born in the Cold War laboratory; its ongoing
integration into post-Cold War society represents a significant expansion of the
laboratory’s practices under the guises of commerce, entertainment, news, and
other needs and interests.
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And what of its impact on higher education and scholarly research? Consider
the ways popular Web 2.0 websites have begun to rupture with the protocols of the
disciplines. Google’s user-driven page-ranking algorithms exhibit a remarkable
ability, independent of credentialed specialists, to push good ideas to the top and
screen out bad (or at least unpopular) ones by aggregated unreasoned choices.
Wikipedia’s decentralized, collaborative forms of editorship and peer review have
likewise begun to reveal the collective expertise and surprising rigor attainable by
self-selected groups of largely non-academic volunteers.17 Social networking sites
create spontaneous communities around every conceivable interest, from
consumer goods to political issues to personal hobbies. Social tagging, indexing,
and bookmarking techniques build on real-time user feedback to create folk taxon-
omies or ‘folksonomies’ reorganizing information and recategorizing knowledge
on an encyclopedic array of subjects, many of them outside the purview of tradi-
tional academic disciplines. Everywhere, online texts, whether scanned or born
digital, are now trivially easy to cut and paste, recombine, hyperlink, gloss,
comment, and blog upon. The authorship, authority, and fixity of texts have
become confused as a result, a development potentially threatening to the
disciplinary practice of allocating status, recognition, and career advancement on
the basis of academic publications with clearly identifiable authors and stable
textual forms.
Notwithstanding the hype surrounding the Internet, however, the disciplines
are likely to exhibit considerable resilience in the face of these apparent threats.
Computers do dramatically improve access to texts and other forms of informa-
tion, but anyone intent on adding to our store of learning must still expend the
same time and effort as before to read, think, and write about them. The stan-
dards governing new contributions to knowledge remain those of disciplinary
communities: of careful review, critique, and response by peer experts both before
and after publication. No alternative means has yet been found of legitimating
new knowledge claims and culling sound ideas from the bogus or useless ones
pervasive on the Web. Nor is there any inherent reason to fear the degradation of
traditional literacy—the silent, individual, isolated, linear consumption of printed
books—and its replacement by massively hyperlinked, collaboratively authored,
portable e-texts of various sizes, shapes, and formats. The disciplines were, after
all, first founded on decidedly painstaking practices of close reading (of the Bible,
of the classics) that ran athwart the promiscuous consumption of Enlightenment-
era print media. Humanistic scholars have long been accustomed to the problems
of information overload and the instability of texts. And even though today’s print
publishers suffer from diminishing profits and libraries struggle to cover the costs
of science journals and university-press monographs,18 scholars will no doubt find
technological work-arounds that preserve the accessibility, permanence, and peer
review of texts as the sine qua non of scholarly publication. Adapting university
pedagogy and scholarly research to today’s information technologies in short
requires merely mid-level reform of a stable institutional complex, not its
wholesale reinvention.
Discipline in the sense of academic specialization has always been yoked to disci-
pline in the sense of behavioral conditioning, meaning that however distracting
and destabilizing the effects of computerization may prove in the short term, the
changes it heralds are easily absorbable in principle. The growth of cyberspace is
unlikely in itself to disrupt the disciplines. The threats to the latter come more
from other sources, whereas the real potential of cyberspace to reconfigure
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knowledge practices is tied to larger trends within the laboratory. I take up these
contentions in the next two sections, respectively.
Higher Education
Coinciding with the networked computer revolution, the world’s largest higher
education system, that of the United States, endured a series of stinging critiques in
the 1980s and 1990s. These ranged from right-wing diatribes against political
correctness and the evisceration of the Western canon to polemics on the left
decrying the corporatization of the university and the adoption of quantitative
metrics of assessing scholarly ‘excellence’.19 Both the left and the right converged
around a belief that the disciplines—particularly their original, humanistic core—
were under increasing threat from those who saw knowledge in purely instrumen-
tal terms, whether as a means of political empowerment (in the view of conservative
detractors) or as a key input to economic growth (in the view of some liberals).
Both agreed, too, albeit from widely different perspectives, that universities were
failing in their traditional function of training broad-minded citizens for modern
nation-states. Whether defending the old European classics or extolling their
multiculturalist replacements, critics seemed united around the assumption that
the disciplines, whatever their specific content, bear a sacred civic responsibility to
instill intellectual standards. As part of their historic social contract with the public
patrons of higher education, disciplines uphold disinterested intellectualism as the
primary mission of the university, a mission now embattled on all sides.
Two decades later, attacks on political correctness have substantially lost their
edge while concerns about corporate management and values have only
increased.20 With respect to the former, economic globalization has apparently
vindicated the need for a decidedly multicultural curriculum and validated, if only
as a by-product, the arguments of predominantly left-leaning university academics.
But many still fear that the professoriate is experiencing a dramatic decline in
status, income, and autonomy as corporate culture continues its march through
the academy. Adjuncts, for example, are increasingly replacing tenure-line faculty
in universities driven by the bottom line.21 The jargon of ‘leveraging human capi-
tal’ for ‘comparative advantage’ remains ubiquitous.22 Most insidiously, corporate-
minded administrators and accreditors have adopted the practices and pretensions
of managerial social science to encroach on the prerogatives of traditional faculty.
The widespread adoption of ‘assessment rubrics’ to measure teaching outcomes
substitutes external benchmarks for the deeply internalized standards of intellec-
tual judgment professors acquire in being socialized to particular disciplines.
Europe’s Bologna Process envisions similarly bureaucratic methods to standardize
university degrees and enhance the Continent’s economic competitiveness. Its
American admirers are now striving to ‘tune’ degree requirements in the United
States as well,23 urging the codification of standards already tacitly enforced by the
circulation of scholars and ideas within national disciplinary networks.
Many academics, seeing the writing on the wall, defend the liberal arts and
sciences precisely for their economic practicality, touting the utility of broad and
flexible training for a post-industrial job market in which the occupations of
tomorrow may not yet even exist today. One professor upholds the ancient liberal
traditions of rhetoric and persuasion as eminently marketable skills in a modern
consumer society overrun by a bewildering array of products and services compet-
ing within an ‘economy of attention’.24 Another believes universities can thrive
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by retooling themselves around interdisciplinary projects—like the study of
media, or money, or water—that redeploy discipline-specific methods around
questions of more general public import.25 A confusing welter of arguments and
proposals for educational reform now crowds public discourse. One common
denominator, however, seems to be the elision of national citizenship with partici-
pation in a globalized economy. As US President Barack Obama said in February
2009, 
In a global economy, where the most valuable skill you can sell is your
knowledge, a good education is no longer just a pathway to opportunity. It is a
pre-requisite … because we know the countries that out-teach us today will out-
compete us tomorrow.26
The incursion of economic and managerial imperatives into higher education
dovetails with another powerful trend, toward more active interfacing between
university research and corporate interests. Semi-autonomous university research
institutes, technology transfer offices, and various fundraising and outreach oppor-
tunities all capitalize on marketable natural- and social-scientific achievements
emanating from university labs in applications ranging from nanotechnology and
green chemistry to educational testing and addiction counseling. Such endeavors
speak to a realignment of interests and personnel bringing laboratory scientists
into closer contact with university administrators, venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs, and their own scientific counterparts employed in corporate-based labs.27
The density of these contacts has carried universities beyond their traditional
economic role as self-contained incubators of useful inventions and discoveries that
then function as externalities in being taken up by knowledge-intensive firms.28
Instead, a revolving door of people, ideas, techniques, and organizational practices
has now opened between the university and corporate worlds. Many now gladly
trade research autonomy for lucrative—and intellectually exciting—positions in
industry. Knowledge-intensive firms like Google and Microsoft even offer perqui-
sites like sabbatical leaves and research fellowships to entice those who might
otherwise enter academia.
Contacts with the corporate world increasingly distance laboratory practitioners
from their erstwhile humanistic brethren under the traditional rubric of ‘arts and
sciences’. Their networks may even begin to act as the leading edge of a deeper
institutional change.29 Although the successes of such ventures cannot be straight-
forwardly replicated even in many scientific fields, let alone non-scientific ones,
they may yet reach a tipping point where academics’ involvement with non-
academic institutions—not only corporations, but also governments, hospitals,
schools, or NGOs—becomes the norm, not the exception. Such a development
would confound the key principle on which the disciplines were first founded: that
the dynamic of scholarly specialization furnishing new disciplinary questions and
methods should take place entirely within the ivory tower, in a pristine and publicly
subsidized marketplace of ideas placed atop the educational system. Natural and
social scientists, while grounded in and loyal to this disciplinary ideal, have long
been accustomed to crossover activities serving outside economic and political
interests in ways largely alien to their colleagues in the humanities.
Taken together, recent developments in higher education confirm the progres-
sive institutional demotion of the disciplines and a concomitant rise in the influ-
ence of the laboratory. To forecast the laboratory’s supersession of the disciplines is
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in no way to prophesy that scientists in white coats and safety goggles will
commandeer their humanist colleagues’ classrooms. Nor does it assume that
philosophers, historians, and literary critics will be required to adopt quantitative
methods, perform experiments, and test falsifiable hypotheses. Humanists may
simply see their research subordinated to their teaching function, an entirely
salutary development if it produces fewer unread monographs and more creative
pedagogical experimentation inside (and perhaps outside) the classroom.
Admittedly, the greater prestige of science disciplines relative to the humanities
has spawned many proposals, such as E. O. Wilson’s intemperate call for
‘consilience’,30 to subordinate all fields of knowledge to the scientific method. New
interdisciplinary fields like behavioral economics, cognitive neuroscience, and
evolutionary biology likewise challenge humanists’ claims to better understand
rational choice, the mind, or belief in God. In large measure, these salvos amount
to internecine academic turf battles with little potential to disrupt the underlying
principle of a structural division of labor among fields. Still, as the social contract
between university and society is renegotiated, the laboratory’s values, practices,
and ideology may prove better suited than those of the disciplines to reconfiguring
our institutions around economic and political imperatives and changes in the
collective cultural imagination.
The disciplines have long relied upon the nation-state as the sponsor and bene-
ficiary of tiered mass education systems and their attendant academic specialties.
That function is unlikely to disappear even amidst widespread state disinvestment
and its replacement by corporate funding, private philanthropy, and student
borrowing that increasingly converts deferential pupils into cost-conscious consum-
ers. But as the laboratory takes the lead in brokering new alliances and affinities
among groups both inside and outside scientific disciplines, other constituencies of
the university will be forced to adapt or face obsolescence. In an increasingly post-
national, globalized world, the laboratory’s ideology favoring experiment,
entrepreneurship, and social engagement is likely to gain the upper hand—and in
the long run, possibly even reassert the value of pursuing knowledge for its own
sake against the instrumentally minded.
Science
At the same time that the laboratory has begun to enjoy increasing autonomy
beyond the discipline-dominated research university, it has also evolved new institu-
tional features partly transcending disciplinary frameworks, often in reaction to
external pressures. Citizens, activists, and entrepreneurs have in recent decades
challenged monopolies of disciplinary expertise, responding both to the successes
and to the notable failures of science, medicine, social engineering, and market-
able technologies. Thriving in widely varying incarnations as ‘impure science’, ‘citi-
zen science’, or ‘mode 2 science’, the ‘post-disciplinary’ laboratory mobilizes a
range of new constituencies not only to monitor its production of knowledge but in
many cases to redesign its innermost practices. What one might also call the ‘partic-
ipatory’ laboratory maintains as an inherited institutional feature a cardinal
emphasis on technical skill, experimentation, and the value of objectivity as defin-
ing components of knowledge creation, but it increasingly dispenses with strictly
disciplinary protocols of peer evaluation in enlisting the participation of those it
formerly treated either as test subjects or as external patrons and clients. This
development signals a seismic shift in institutions potentially more consequential
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Mc
Ne
el
y,
 I
an
 F
.]
 A
t:
 1
6:
51
 2
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
09
Current Trends in Knowledge Production 347
than changes in information technology and higher education. Still, it ultimately
amounts to merely mid-level reform, cementing rather than undermining the
laboratory’s broader ascendancy.
Impure Science. Among the best illustrations of the post-disciplinary laboratory is
offered by Steven Epstein’s study of gay activists in the development of treatments
for AIDS—a paradigmatic example (and perhaps still the sole successful one) of
what he calls ‘impure science’.31 Epstein shows how initial conflict led to eventual
compromise between scientists wanting to maintain pristine research protocols and
groups like ACT UP clamoring for quicker results from clinical trials. Activists
exploited their contacts with the gay community to provide biomedical researchers
access to and knowledge of their patient population. Drawn from a relatively afflu-
ent and well-educated demographic, activists also proved adept enough at self-
education to gain a ‘seat at the table’ alongside disciplinary experts, able to hold
their own in discussions ranging from cellular biochemistry to protocol design.
Researchers responded by modifying their standards in ways not strictly sanctioned
by their disciplinary peers, but that nonetheless qualified as objective experiments
requiring technical skill to test clear hypotheses. These collaborations hastened the
discovery and testing of new therapies for AIDS as a panoply of stakeholders united
around the specific goal or project of curing HIV.
Citizen science. This denotes experiments that rely on dispersed non-expert
volunteers to gather data, whether to track bird migrations, search for extraterres-
trial intelligence, or monitor climate change.32 Citizen science is still quite limited
in its impact and in its suitability for rigorous scientific projects, but it betokens a
fascinating revival of the predisciplinary practices of the republic of letters, which
relied pervasively on dispersed correspondents to collect and interpret data on
meteorological and astronomical phenomena and natural history. The appetite for
discovery and growth in baseline education found in modern knowledge societies
may enable citizen science to expand in other ways, spawning forums not only for
amateur curiosity, but also for monitoring more complex scientific experiments
with tangible social, environmental, and political consequences. One can easily
imagine a range of applications from medical therapies to green energy to the
study of traffic patterns, all capitalizing on informed decentralized scrutiny of the
self and of the local environment.
Risk. Yet another context where post-disciplinary practices have emerged in the
laboratory concerns science involving high medical, technological, or environmen-
tal risk. Risk assessment and risk management have in recent decades moved from
the prosaic technical domain of engineers and accountants to the very center of
social theory. Modern society is increasingly prone to disasters and setbacks as the
complexity of our technological systems outstrips our ability to model, anticipate,
and correct for systemic vulnerabilities.33 Dramatic disasters like the Chernobyl
meltdown and the explosion of the USA’s Challenger space shuttle have pointed up
the dangers of what Sheila Jasanoff calls ‘technologies of hubris’.34 These must be
countered, she argues, by ‘technologies of humility’, involving formal participation
by citizens and other stakeholders and an ‘extended’ practice of peer review
encompassing quality control and deliberative, open-ended risk assessment proce-
dures. Purely disciplinary standards, Jasanoff observes, entail ‘peripheral blindness’
both toward the negative societal impact of spuriously ‘objective’ scientific findings
and toward purely scientific questions that happen to lie outside the frame of inves-
tigative analysis—as in the case of toxicity studies focusing on one drug at a time, in
isolation from other biochemical interactions. A more inclusive, participatory
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process of discovery does not necessarily dilute and may in fact increase the quality,
validity, and objectivity of laboratory-generated knowledge.35 Jasanoff focuses
largely on the hard sciences, but her analysis applies with even greater force to the
hubris of social-scientific experiments, from inner-city housing projects with their
massive unintended social consequences to the supposedly fail-safe risk modeling
paradigms that helped cause the financial crisis of 2008.
The knowledge economy. One can hardly envision a better illustration of laboratory-
like experimentation outside the disciplines than the free competition of knowledge-
based firms under post-industrial capitalism. The production of knowledge-intensive
goods and services may seem out of place on a list of participatory practices focused
mainly on ethical and political conundrums, but this is only because modern liberal-
capitalist economies enshrine as an ethical and political principle the freedom of
entrepreneurial firms to harness knowledge for profit, subjecting them largely ex post
facto to regulatory oversight, legal constraint, and citizen monitoring. In fact it is in
private industry that the social dispersion of knowledge-producing capacities typical
of the post-disciplinary laboratory has advanced the furthest. Economic theory once
conceptualized knowledge as a public good, either assuming new technologies and
discoveries to be unproblematically accessible to all, or treating their production in
research universities as an externality, a free gift from pure-minded disciplines to the
profit-oriented marketplace.36 This view has been completely overturned by econo-
mists’ renewed appreciation for the local, highly technical knowledges produced by
corporations, not just in their formal R&D departments but pervasively within
increasingly fluid organizational hierarchies. Whether crystallized as a form of intel-
lectual property that can be patented and protected, or treated as a more diffused
capacity of networks of skilled knowledge workers, knowledge now flows in and
among firms as a species of the tacit skill central to the laboratory since its very incep-
tion. Not merely encompassing the hands-on facility to construct an assembly line
or design a solar panel, such knowledge emphatically includes, for example, the
social-scientific marketing research that systematically incorporates consumer feed-
back. It also encompasses organizational leadership techniques descending directly
from the first social-scientific management consultants in the early 1900s. The famed
knowledge-society guru Peter Drucker even exalts the manager’s ability to lead
knowledge-intensive organizations as the noblest of intellectual pursuits, on a par
with the humanities themselves.37
Mode 2 knowledge. As we seek some coherence in what might seem a scattered set
of developments, the theory of ‘mode 2 knowledge’ recently developed by a group
of European social theorists proves especially useful.38 Though short on specifics and
employing a deliberately vague rubric to avoid imposing a premature label on an
embryonic phenomenon, their analysis nonetheless offers a compelling framework
for understanding the post-disciplinary laboratory. Mode 2 knowledge production
occurs, first, in a ‘context of application’, not of impractical curiosity-driven discov-
ery. It draws its problems from real-world non-academic concerns and not the special-
ized interests of disciplinary communities. Second, mode 2 science brings together
interdisciplinary teams to work on well-defined projects on a transient or temporary
basis, unlike the decades- or even lifelong commitments typical of disciplinary
scientists’ careers and research agendas. The portable skill sets typical of today’s
knowledge workers are more valuable in such contexts than the deeply arcane exper-
tise of dedicated academics. Finally, mode 2 effaces hierarchical divisions between
pure and applied science, theory and technique, disinterested knowledge and public
or commercial application. Reflexivity is its hallmark: theories are adapted quickly
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in response to practical successes and failures, and scientific products and inventions
are then assessed with an eye toward quality control, profitability, impact assessment,
and rigorous accountability toward economic, social, political, and environmental
interests and imperatives.
Entrepreneurs, consultants, managers, marketers, consumers, social workers,
public watchdogs, government regulators, and the media all have potential roles to
play in mode 2 knowledge production. Most important, though, are the new func-
tions assumed by both higher education and information technology. The social
distribution of knowledge-making capacities marks yet another incursion on the
prerogatives of the disciplines to determine the questions, methods, and standards
driving the pursuit of knowledge, but the staffing of mode 2 projects relies heavily
on a steady stream of highly educated workers and other stakeholders that only
universities can provide. Equally crucial, the ‘knowledge society’ depends on
citizen-workers able to question and critique their own specialized training by
situating their inevitably circumscribed economic roles amidst wider civic
concerns. Training citizens to act as scientifically informed, verbally articulate
participants in mode 2 knowledge production: this is what a higher education
system repurposed by the ascendancy of the laboratory might (and perhaps has
already begun to) look like. Such a role is entirely consonant with the moral
tutelage universities have always exerted, but that under the disciplines has been
dissipated by the inculcation of a plethora of field-specific work ethics.
Mode 2 science potentially creates a new use, too, for Web 2.0 online communi-
ties beyond their current roles as forums for entertainment, commerce, and social
networking. The same technologies that now organize online chess tournaments
and high school reunions may easily be recoded to gather feedback and orches-
trate pushback among the widely dispersed constituencies affected by scientific
projects. Online networks provide a ready-made ‘context of application’ for the
rollout of new therapies, inventions, products, and policies for subsequent
experimental cycles of improvement and adjustment. Cyberspace can also offer a
powerful model of self-organization to inspire practices of collective experimenta-
tion within other institutions like hospitals, schools, neighborhood groups, govern-
ments, and NGOs.
Pressures on the post-disciplinary laboratory to integrate ethical, political, social,
economic, and environmental concerns through the active participation of new
constituencies no doubt undermine the autonomy of disciplinary ‘pure’ science,
but even such profound changes are unlikely to threaten the tacit knowledge, prac-
tices of objectivity, and experiment-driven methodology that remain the core
components of the laboratory as an institution. They may instead help correct
tendencies toward scientistic, technocratic overreach that have plagued the labora-
tory since its inception, thereby removing the last obstacle to its attaining the truly
comprehensive influence enjoyed by its predecessor institutions.
The Environment
If any truly epochal trend threatens the laboratory’s ascendancy, it is the conflu-
ence of economic globalization with the degradation of the natural environment.
As living standards rise in rapidly developing economies like China, India, and
Brazil, billions more consumers will enter the global marketplace, competing for
ever scarcer resources and accelerating destructive environmental processes from
climate change and fuel shortages to water pollution and pandemic disease.
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Decades may elapse before, say, the lifestyle expectations and resource demands of
the average Chinese worker approach those of her American counterpart, but
only the most optimistic (or myopic) analysts believe that Westerners themselves
will in the long run be able to escape major, disruptive changes in their consump-
tion of energy, food, water, and material goods. The question is whether the labora-
tory, in its broadest institutional incarnation, can sustainably address these
problems on the technical-scientific as well as social-cultural fronts. For it to do so
would require a series of technological breakthroughs from abundant clean energy
to safe genetically modified foods; a variety of social-scientific policymaking and
management techniques allowing these breakthroughs to be introduced within an
economically liberal, politically multipolar global order; and a host of cross-cultural
participatory forums—possibly aided by online social-networking technologies—to
facilitate this process and compensate for the inevitable risks, inequities, uneven
impacts, and unanticipated consequences it will entail.
But even that might not be enough. One need not imagine that the relatively
harmonious economic and political order that has succeeded the Cold War will
experience apocalyptic disruption or collapse into an anarchic ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ to envision a future world of straitened circumstances, difficult choices, and
intensified rivalries. Widespread lifestyle revisions, both upward and downward, are
therefore likely to nurture challenges to the Western ideologies and worldviews
sustaining globalization. This cannot help but have adverse consequences for a
global knowledge monoculture founded on the supremacy of Western universities,
disciplines, and laboratories. Such situations have historically bred the conditions
for fundamental, not just incremental, institutional upheaval.
The skeptic’s view holds that liberal capitalism as practiced in the West is
globally unsustainable and that its modification will require more than mid-level
revision to the laboratory. ‘Liberal’ capitalism need not be understood here to
entail a democratic political order founded on individual citizenship rights and
limited government. It merely connotes a culture that prizes competition among
individuals, firms, and nation-states as an optimal means of allocating resources.
Liberalism also enshrines tolerance, pluralism, and non-interference as a means of
reducing social and political conflict both nationally and internationally. Such a
system, fully ascendant in the West but only partially so in the robust economies of
East and South Asia, must be able to tolerate and materially sustain the huge
amounts of waste, redundancy, duplication, and Schumpeterian creative destruc-
tion that free competition entails. Illustrations are ready at hand. Affluent, well-
educated students dither in search of careers well into their twenties while migrant
and sporadically employed workers churn through series of jobs. Venture capital-
ists invest in multiple failed startups before finding the one that pays off. Politicians
defer large-scale remedies to social and environmental problems until crises force
their hand.
Liberal-capitalist societies already aim to educate skilled citizens flexible and
resilient enough to adapt their careers and life expectations to personal setbacks,
economic recessions, and the other inescapable cycles of creative destruction on
both the individual and societal levels. Their knowledge institutions reflect and rein-
force these values as part of their larger social contract. Under the laboratory’s hege-
mony, the limitless trial and error endemic to liberal-capitalist economies indeed
finds its analogue in the processes by which knowledge itself is created: as that which
can ultimately be shown to ‘work’ through repeated experiment. The husbanding
of technical skill to generate objective knowledge through experimentation stands
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as the laboratory’s defining practice—its most central and abiding feature, beyond
its origins in university disciplines and beyond its tentative evolution toward post-
disciplinary, participatory characteristics. And experimentation relies upon a prin-
cipled commitment to endure failure and waste resources in the pursuit of replica-
ble breakthroughs. While largely unavoidable in manipulations of the natural world,
this principle has never applied with equal success to the spaces of human social
interaction to which the laboratory has also historically laid claim, in workplaces,
schools, cities, and beyond.
Assuming some sort of post-liberal social and ideological order will result from
the combined effects of environmental distress and global leveling, the laboratory
will remain necessary yet insufficient to meet these sweeping new external
demands—a pattern entirely consistent with prior reinventions of knowledge. The
laboratory undoubtedly still harbors tremendous potential to generate astonishing
results that comfort and inspire, that open up new horizons while rendering our
existing practices more sustainable. It may even come to rely systematically on civic
participation, risk and impact assessment, and other socially robust practices of
mode 2 knowledge production. But the laboratory cannot in itself effect the
personal changes in consciousness and behavior needed to bring about the large-
scale cultural transformation that a post-consumerist society would require. Not
even the most totalitarian, scientistic, technocratic social engineering schemes of
the twentieth century succeeded in this respect.
The next knowledge institution, whether it takes decades or centuries to
emerge, is therefore likely to incorporate some kind of personal ethical or even
spiritual component. Subjectivity, not objectivity, would be its watchword. This may
engender something like a revival of the devotional practices enabling monaster-
ies—the West’s second knowledge institution—to govern their denizens’ daily
habits and remold their ethical horizons at the most intimate level. More likely,
however, is a milder and more ecumenical alternative, one not limited to a specific
religious tradition but instead founded on cross-cultural translation and cultural
mediation. Cross-cultural translation will certainly become central to resource
management and coordinated response to ecological change at the global level of
nation-states and international policymaking bodies. So too, it will remain an essen-
tial task at the middle level of NGOs and multinational corporations, with their
simultaneously local and global knowledges. Its most fundamental impact,
however, is likely to occur at the level of individual lifestyles. One can only fantasize
about what this might entail—radical ecotourism, lifelong periodic study abroad,
mobile kibbutzim, living off the grid. But the choices and changes individuals must
make, to adjust their diet, health and hygiene, to modify their patterns of work and
leisure, and to reshape their lived environments—from the suburbs and highways
of the American sunbelt to the sprawling megalopolises of Asia and Latin
America—will come to rely on modes and rationales for seeking knowledge that
are wholly alien to the laboratory in any of its contemporary guises. Eventually
these changes may coalesce into the prototype for a wholly new institution.
Conclusion
As we contemplate the future prospects for a true ‘knowledge society’—whatever
the term may entail—the framework offered by Reinventing Knowledge is useful in at
least three respects. First, it helps us to distinguish fundamental from mid-level
institutional change, offering a series of historical comparisons by which to gauge
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whether today’s upheavals together amount to a true reinvention of knowledge.
Second, it helps us to predict the probable course of transformations already well
underway, illuminating the subtle processes by which ideas, practices, and edifices
of knowledge are recycled and repurposed as one institution supersedes its prede-
cessor. Third, it helps us to group together seemingly disparate phenomena inside
and outside knowledge institutions, identifying the core, abiding redefinitions of
knowledge that establish a new social contract between knowledge-seekers and
society. By all these benchmarks, the ongoing shift from the disciplines to the
laboratory is itself dramatic and destabilizing enough to account for many of the
diverse and unsettling trends that surround us. Let us review these trends now.
First, for all the dazzling possibilities opened up by cyberspace and the Internet,
the advent of new media and information technologies does not in itself portend
radical institutional change. Like all tools, these technologies conform to the larger
purposes dictated for them, in this case by knowledge institutions. Thus the disci-
plines are likely to adopt the best practices of new communications technologies
while retaining whichever traditional methods of collecting and analyzing texts and
information are appropriate to each field. The laboratory may co-opt cyberspace
more vigorously, forming new online communities promoting the adoption of
participatory, post-disciplinary experimental forms—again, however, on its own
institutionally-determined terms.
The crisis in higher education, a second trend, reflects the eroding autonomy of
tertiary education in an era when states retrench in their financial support of
universities and, together with citizenries and corporate interests, demand more
practical services from them. Specialized curiosity-driven research will certainly
survive but in a form subordinated to larger societal problems, concerns, and
agendas that increasingly displace the self-perpetuating questions, methods, and
foci of particular disciplinary communities. Far from presaging a devolution of
higher learning into a purely utilitarian or instrumental enterprise, however, such
a development would powerfully vindicate the umbrella ideology of the labora-
tory—with the knowledge society itself becoming the space of experimentation.
Among the forums where post-disciplinary models of skill and experimentation
are most prevalent are those at the interface between science and society, where
knowledge-producing capacities are now pervasively dispersed among non-
academic scientists, entrepreneurs, workers, citizens, and other groups and organi-
zations. These ‘mode 2’ forms of knowledge production, together constituting a
third trend, cement the hegemony of the laboratory as it graduates from an institu-
tion once lodged within the academic disciplines to one that is increasingly self-
sustaining. Though historically prone to disastrous overreach in technocratic engi-
neering projects, the laboratory now exhibits a newfound potential to integrate
these external groups into its experimental protocols, maximizing profit and social
utility while avoiding undue risk and unethical consequences.
No institution of knowledge has ultimately thrived without marrying the ideol-
ogy and values of its host society to the standards of intellectual activity produced
by knowledge-seekers themselves. As we confront a fourth major trend—the inter-
twining of globalization and ecological decay—it is this issue that will ultimately
make or break the laboratory as an institution. Barring a miraculous series of
technical breakthroughs enabling the sustainable universalization of current West-
ern living standards, resource competition and environmental degradation may
eventually undermine the liberal-capitalist social order on which the laboratory’s
experiment-driven practices ultimately rely. If and when this ever occurs, a new
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institution may crystallize around practices of individual lifestyle reform in a deeply
cross-cultural setting.
Looking into the future, much depends on how far along we find ourselves on
the cycle of institutional reinvention. The length of these cycles has steadily
contracted over the last two millennia, and a mechanical extrapolation of this
trend suggests that a new institution is just around the corner. But there is no
reason to assume this will automatically be the case. The twentieth century in
particular witnessed a prolonged institutional stalemate as two rival versions of the
laboratory—the Soviet totalitarian-technocratic and the Western liberal-capitalistic
models—remained locked in competition. The era since the 1970s has been dedi-
cated in large part to confronting the technocratic defects of the Western version
itself. Now that a new set of opportunities and anxieties has replaced those of the
Cold War, we now face the question of how the laboratory will adapt to a fresh set
of challenges.
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